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INNOVATION AND OPTIMAL PUNISHMENT,
WITH ANTITRUST APPLICATIONS
Keith N. Hylton* & Haizhen Lint
ABSTRACT
This article modifies the optimal punishment analysis by incorporating investment incentives with external benefits. In the models examined, the recommendation that the optimal penalty should internalize the marginal social harm is no
longer valid. We focus on antitrust applications. In light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal policy will punish monopolizing firms more leniently than
suggested in the standard static model. It may be optimal not to punish the monopolizing firm at all, or to reward the firm rather than punish it. We examine the
precise balance between penalty and reward in the optimal punishment scheme.

JEL: D42; K14; K21; K42; L41; L43

I. INTRODUCTION
The literature on the economic theory of punishment consists mostly of
models in which offenders are held strictly liable and sanctioned with casespecific optimal penalties. The law, in contrast, applies case-specific cost1
benefit tests to determine liability and uses standardized penalties.
In spite of this difference between the theory of punishment and the practice
in courts, the theory remains useful as a guide for policy. This article follows
tradition by examining optimal penalties as a source of guidelines for legal
policy. The focus here is innovation and punishment, especially in the context
of antitrust.
The prevailing analysis of optimal antitrust penalties holds that in order to
avoid inefficient overdeterrence, the optimal penalty should internalize the
social losses generated by potentially anticompetitive conduct. 2 If enforcement

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Email: knhyltonTbu.edu.
t Assistant Professor of Economics, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Email: hzlin@
indiana.edu. The authors thank the editors of this journal for helpful suggestions.
1 For example, in American antitrust law, the main application for this article's model, courts use
rule of reason analysis to exempt efficient conduct for the most part, while applying statutorily
set penalties or treble damages to the violations. In tort law, courts use the negligence test, or the
risk-utility test in products liability cases, to determine liability. Each of these legal tests is a type
of cost-benefit test.
2 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169 (1968).

(cIhe

Author (2013). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

2

Journalof CompetitionLaw & Economics

were perfect and costless, such a penalty would internalize the transfer from
consumers and the deadweight loss. 3 Thus, if a monopolizing firm introduces
efficiencies, it might still have an incentive to carry out its monopolizing
conduct, as long as the efficiency gain exceeds the deadweight loss.
But this analysis does not incorporate plausible social benefits from monopolization. The prevailing analysis is based on a static model in which the gains
from monopolization accrue to the firm and the losses are suffered by society.
In contrast, a dynamic perspective4 would take into account the social gains
from investments made by the firm in its quest to become a monopoly.
Investments in market-creating or market-expanding innovation should be
incorporated into the analysis of punishment.
We modify the optimal punishment analysis by incorporating investment
that has external benefits-such as the creation of surplus for consumers. In
the models examined here, the recommendation that the optimal antitrust
penalty should internalize the marginal social harm-as measured by the
sum of the consumer surplus transfer, the deadweight loss, and the cost of
enforcement-is no longer valid. We explore the recommendations from two
simple versions of the dynamic story, one in which the offender invests in
market-expanding innovation before committing the offense (monopolization), and another in which the victim invests before suffering an offense.
In the offender-investment model, which is the core of this article, the
optimal penalty for monopolization is a function of the consumer harm, the residual consumer surplus (after monopolization), the cost of enforcement, and
the relative responsiveness of innovation and monopolization to changes in the
penalty. Specifically, the optimal penalty is a weighted average of the static
penalty (internalizing consumer harm and enforcement cost) and an innovation subsidy (internalizing consumer benefit and enforcement cost), with the
weights determined by the relative sensitivities of investment and monopolization to punishment. This has implications for law and punishment policy.
The most obvious implication is that in light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal policy will punish monopolizing firms more leniently than
suggested by the static model. It may be optimal not to punish the firm at all,
or to reward the firm rather than punish it. In this sense, the model provides a
Schumpeterian perspective on punishment,5 as well as the groundwork for a

William M. Landes, OptimalSanctionsfor Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652 (1983).
4 On the difference between static and dynamic punishment models, see Siu Fai Leung, How to
Make the Fine Fit the Corporate Crime? An Analysis of Static and Dynamic Optimal Punishment
Theories, 45 J. PUB. EcoN. 243 (1991). Our framework is simpler than Leung's. We use the term
dynamic here in the sense common in the antitrust literature to refer to an analysis that takes the
investment effects of enforcement into account. SeeJ. Gregory Sidak & David F. Teece, Dynamic
Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 581 (2009).
JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY ch. 7-8 (1943). Schumpeter

famously criticized the static model of competition for ignoring the social benefits of innovation,
and the need for firms to gain monopoly power in order to earn a positive return on innovation.
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positive theory of monopolization law, which has been puzzlingly lenient over
its history. 6
In addition, comparative statics results for the optimal penalty differ from
the static analysis. The optimal penalty does not increase monotonically with
consumer harm, and a fall in the probability of apprehension does not necessarily imply an increase in the optimal penalty. A combination of a high fine
and a low probability of punishment may not be optimal.
The connection between innovation and punishment is a concern in both
antitrust and products liability. In United States v. Microsoft,7 the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to apply a per se liability rule to the firm's technological integration of the internet browser and operating systems because of its
fear that such a rule would discourage innovation.S In Trinko v. Verizon,9 the
Supreme Court cited the negative innovation effect as a basis for refusing to
adopt the essential facilities theory of monopolization. 0 Products liability lawsuits against drug manufacturers have been met with the criticism that their
success will deter the development and marketing of new drugs. The unexplored issue in these cases is the precise relationship between the deterrence of
offensive conduct and the encouragement of innovation in an optimal punishment scheme. 12
Parts II.A and II.B set up the static model, which replicates the standard
optimal penalty recommendation. Parts II.C.2 and II.C.3 explore punishment
in a setting in which the offender makes an investment that provides social

For a review, see Edward Mason, Schumpeter on Monopoly and the Large Firm, 33 REv. EcoN. &
STAT. 139 (1951).
6 On the perceived leniency of monopolization law and its explanation, see David S. Evans & Keith

N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and Its Implicationsfor the
Objectives ofAntitrust, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 203 (2008).
7 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 89-90. In addition, much of the commentary about Microsoft focuses on the implications
of antitrust enforcement for innovation in the technology industries; see David S. Evans &

Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive
Industries, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE EcoNoMY 1 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott
Stern eds., MIT Press 2002).
9 Verizon Commc'n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
'0 Id. at 407.
" See, e.g., Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, Vioxx Verdict's Dark Side, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 23, 2005, at Al5, availableat http:/www.boston.com/news/globe/editorialopinion/oped/
articles/2005/08/23/vioxx verdicts dark side/.
12 One question generated by this model is whether the optimal penalty results derived here could
be implemented. There are two ways to approach implementation. First, the variables that the
optimal penalty incorporates indicate the matters that courts should take into account in the
relevant law on liability. Second, the optimal penalty could be estimated by acquiring
information on the probability of detection (or apprehension), the harm to victims, the
sensitivity of investment to cash flow, and the residual consumer surplus. Although courts do
not attempt to estimate optimal case-specific penalties, a move to such a regime, as originally
advocated in Becker, would not be infeasible. See Becker, supra note 2.
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benefits, the returns to which are a function of an offense that he may commit
in the future as well as the punishment for that offense. Part II.C.4 examines
an extension in which the victims make investments, the expected returns to
which are reduced by an offense that may be committed by the offender. Part
III discusses implications for the law.

II. MODEL
A. Basic Assumptions
All actors are risk neutral and victims are the only parties who suffer loss. The
state apprehends an offender after an injury has occurred. The state does not
attempt to apprehend the offender in each instance of an offense, and therefore
the probability of apprehension (equivalently, detection) given an injury is less
than one.
Let z = the probability of apprehension, 0 < z' < z < 1; 13 c = the cost to the
state of apprehending the offender, c > 0; v = the loss suffered by a victim, v >
0; F the fine imposed on apprehended offender. M the gross gain to the
offender from committing an offense, and is governed by the probability distribution function H with corresponding density function h, where h(M) > 0 for
0 < M < A,

and h(M) = 0 otherwise.

The offender cannot satisfy his preferences through the market; thus in
order to enjoy the gain M he must commit an offense. Because the offender
will commit the offense when M > zF, the probability of an offense is 1-H(zF).
If MII < zF no crimes will be committed, so that F= Mu/z is the minimum level
of the fine that achieves complete deterrence.
The timeline of events is as follows: the offense occurs (probability 1-H
(zF)) causing a loss of v; enforcement occurs with probability z; the offender is
apprehended at cost c, and then punished with a fine F. 14

B. Optimal Punishment Policy: Static Case
The optimal punishment policy is the combination of the fine and the probability of apprehension that minimizes the cost of offenses and the cost of
13 We assume a lower bound z' on the probability of apprehension because no state ever
chooses

to go without any law enforcement at all. The minimal "night watchman" state envisioned by
philosophers limits itself to enforcing criminal prohibitions and (maybe) contracts. The
minimal apprehension probability is the level consistent with the minimum expenditure
necessary (staffing, equipment) to enforce criminal prohibitions.
14 Once apprehended, punishment occurs with certainty, given the assumption of strict liability.
In a later part, we consider a "rule of reason" standard under which punishment depends on
whether the offender violated the rule of reason.
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avoiding offenses: 15
C = (1 - H(zF))(v + zc) + H(zF)E[M|M < zF].

(1)

The optimal policy can be stated as follows:
Proposition 1: If Mo > v + z'c, then the optimal punishment policy is to set
the fine so that it satisfies F= F = v/z' + c, and the probability of apprehension
at the minimum level z' (internalization rule). If Mo < v + z'c, then the optimal
policy is to set the fine and probability of apprehension so that zF > M. (complete deterrence rule).
This result replicates Becker, and Polinsky and Shavell (1992)16 with minor
modifications. In intuitive terms, if the offender's activity is potentially efficient, in the sense that the gain to at least some offenders exceeds the marginal
social cost of the offense, then the optimal penalty internalizes the marginal
social cost of the offense. In order to minimize enforcement costs, the state
sets the probability of apprehension at its minimum level. However, if the
offender's activity is not potentially efficient, the optimal policy is to completely deter it by eliminating the offender's gain.
It follows that an antitrust punishment authority should distinguish conduct
that is potentially efficient from conduct that is not, and apply the internalization policy in the potentially efficient category and the complete deterrence
policy in the inefficient category. Suppose that the monopolizing firm takes an
act that allows it to extract surplus from consumers and may also generate an efficiency gain, as shown in Figure 1-such as an exclusive dealing contract that
forecloses competition and at the same time reduces supply costs. Because M=
T+ E,1 7 and v = T+ D, the optimal static penalty is F = (T+ D) / z' + c. If no efficiency gain were possible, the optimal policy would seek to eliminate expected
profits. F would serve the gain-elimination purpose, as would any other penalty
greater than Tz'.

C. Optimal Punishment Policy: Dynamic Setting
In the previous part we examined the enforcement model in the context of
antitrust, replicating the static enforcement policy (internalize transfer and
deadweight loss, plus enforcement cost). In this part, we extend the model to
incorporate investment by the offender.
15 Equivalent objective functions would require maximizing the net benefit from offenses NB
(offenses) = (1 - H(zF))E[M - v - zc | M> zF], or the difference between net deterrence
benefits and the costs of enforcement H(zF)(v - E[M M < zF]) - (1 - H(zF))zc.
16 Becker, supra note 2; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal

Magnitudeand Probabilityof Fines, 35 J.L. & EcoN. 133 (1992).

17 Because M is a random variable and Tis fixed, E, the efficiency gain, is a random variable. The
efficiency gain associated with the offense determines the uncertainty associated with the gross
gain from the offense.
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Figure 1. Monopolization with an efficiency gain

The reason for taking investment by the offender into account is that it is
important in the antitrust setting, especially in monopolization cases. Suppose
that the monopolizing firm has undertaken investments that benefit consumers, such as creating a new product market. The static enforcement policy
may be socially excessive because it might prevent the firm from earning a
break-even return on its investments in market creation. This is distinguishable
from the static case without investment, where the product market was already
in existence and the monopolizing firm takes an action that permits it to gain
monopoly power, perhaps also with an efficiency gain. In the model below, the
firm creates the market and then monopolizes it.
1. Assumptions

Using Figure 1, the firm invests in the first period creating the market. In the
second period, the firm takes an action that monopolizes the market. As in the
previous model, the second period action could generate an efficiency gain.
When the monopolizing firm creates the market, it generates S= T+ D + W. If
the firm is deterred from monopolization, consumers get S. If the firm is not
deterred from monopolization, consumers get W.
For example, suppose that in the first period the firm invests in the design
and production of a new artificial tooth that will be ready to market in the
second period. The tooth design can be copied by rivals easily, so the second
period market has the potential to be perfectly competitive. However, the
firm can reduce competitive pressure, and thereby appropriate part of the
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innovation return, by engaging in an exclusionary act at the start of the second
period.' The ideal exclusionary act would be the attainment of a legal barrier
to entry, such as a patent, but such options may not be available to the firm or
may not be effective. 19 Suppose the firm's best option for appropriating some
of the surplus from innovation is to enter into an exclusive dealing contract
with a key resource supplier, 20 and that in addition to excluding competition
the contract reduces supply costs (say, by permitting the resource supplier to
better predict demand).2 1 The returns from the creation of the new artificial
tooth depend on the firm's later success in excluding competition. 22 It Will
have an incentive to monopolize if the gains from monopolization exceed
expected antitrust penalties.

s The exclusionary or monopolizing act could take an infinite number of forms, many of them
seemingly innocent. For example, even the decision to keep rival firms from learning about a
new product under development has an exclusionary effect, because it allows the innovator to
take advantage of lead-time. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1979) (in which the defendant (Kodak) was sued under the Sherman Act for not
pre-disclosing information on a new type of camera film it had created. The court held in favor
of Kodak on the grounds that a pre-disclosure duty would weaken incentives to innovate.).
19 If a patent or exclusive license were available (and effective), the analysis here would still
apply-the optimal penalty should then be understood as the optimal fee for the patent or the
license. Thus, whether or not legal barriers can be used, the optimal penalty result still provides
a useful instrument for regulating the firm's conduct. As for the effectiveness of patents, Wesley
M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh find that patents are "least emphasized"
among manufacturing firms in comparison to other methods of appropriating the returns from
innovation. The general reasons for this could be (1) legal restrictions on availability (novelty,
nonobviousness, naturally occurring substances, and so forth), and (2) difficulty in
enforcement. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their

IntellectualAssets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. ManufacturingFirms Patent (or Not)
(NBER, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
20 This hypothetical is based on the facts of United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d
Cir. 2005). However, the exclusive dealing contract in Dentsply was with dealers rather than
suppliers. An example involving an exclusivity contract with a supplier was Alcoa's contract to
purchase electricity on the condition that the seller refrain from selling electric power to any
other producer of aluminum. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416,
422 (2d Cir. 1945).
21 The tying contract in Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) was explained by
John Peterman as a device that permitted the company to better predict, and thereby take
advantage of economies in, the distribution of salt. John Peterman, The InternationalSalt Case,
22 J.L. & EcoN. 351 (1979).
22 Again, this is true whether the firm uses a legal barrier or self help. We treat the innovation
concept as something given to the innovator and examine the incentive to carry it out. This is
distinguishable from the innovation race in which firms attempt to develop a new technology at
the same time, in which case perpetual rivalry might, or might not, enhance innovation. See
Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. EcoN. 395 (1979); Tom Lee &
Louis L. Wilde, Market Structure and Innovation:A Reformulation, 94 Q. J. ECoN. 429 (1980);
Philippe Aghion, Nicholas Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt,
Competition and Innovation:An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q. J. EcoN. 701 (2005). One can
distinguish the incentive to search for innovations and the incentive to carry a particular
innovation concept out. Competition may reduce the incentive to carry out a particular concept
and increase the incentive to search for an innovation.
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In the remainder we will focus on the optimality condition for the penalty.
Becker's suggestion that the probability of enforcement should be set at its
minimum level (under reasonable assumptions) has not been disturbed in the
subsequent literature (for example, that by Polinsky and Shavell), 23 so there is
no need to reexamine this issue.
2. OptimalPunishment: Offender Investment

The potential offender will invest if the expected return from monopolization,
net of the penalty, exceeds his investment cost. Let the investment cost, ko, be
governed by the probability distribution T with corresponding density y. The
potential offender invests when ko < ko = (1-H(zF)) [E(M | M > zF) - zF],
and the probability of investment is T(ko).
The problem for the social planner is to choose the optimal fine to maximize the net social benefit:
NB = T(ko){ [(1 - H(zF))E(M|M > zF) - E(kolko < ko)]
+ (I - H(zF))(S - v - zc) + H(zF)S},

(2)

where the first term (bracketed) is the net gain from investment to the
would-be monopolist, the second term is the net gain to society if investment
is followed by monopolization (S - v = S - T - D= W), and the third term is
the net gain to society if investment is not followed by monopolization. The
first order condition with respect to the fine is
ONB
OF

(v + zc - S - zF){T(ko)h(zF) +

(ko)(1 - H(zF))2 }

- S{ (ko)H(zF)(1 - H(zF)) - T(ko)h(zF)}

(3)

0.

Thus, the optimal fine satisfies
F

v
=-+c--+z

S

S
z z

W(ko)h(zF*) - (k*)H(zF*)(1 - H(zF*))
0,
)
(ko)h(zF*) + (ko)(1 - H(zF*))2

(4)

where the first two terms are the familiar static penalty, 24 which internalizes
consumer harm and the enforcement cost. The remaining terms involve penalties or subsidies. The firm gets a subsidy of S/z (third term) for the potential
23 If there is a fixed cost in setting the probability of apprehension, the optimal probability may
be
positive for sufficiently small values of the marginal enforcement cost. See Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 16. In addition, if there is a fixed upper limit on the fine, the optimal probability of
apprehension will not necessarily be the minimum level. Risk aversion and the social interest in
raising penalties in order to give prosecutors bargaining leverage are additional factors that
could be considered. See Wallace P. Mullin & Christopher M. Snyder, Should Firms Be Allowed
To Indemnify Their Employees for Sanctions?, 26 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 30 (2010). We do not
explore these variations on the Becker framework here.
24 Landes, supra note 3.
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surplus it delivers to consumers when it creates a new product market. The
surplus is divided by the probability of apprehension because the firm gets no
subsidy from the state in cases in which it is not apprehended. The last term
targets the investment incentive, and it is a combination of subsidy and
penalty. The first component of the numerator reflects a penalty to discourage
monopolization, the second a subsidy to encourage investment.
Overall, the subsidy effect dominates in the last two terms of (4).
Simplifying, we have
F*

v
z

- + c

S(
@(k*) (1- H(zF*))
0)
.
z I((k*)h(zF*) + @(k0 )(1 - H(zF*))2

(5)

Substituting terms from Figure 1, the optimal penalty can be expressed as
F* = (1 -

)T

D) + 0-

+ c,

(6)

where 0 is the last bracketed term in (5), and is a discontinuous function of F
with the properties 0 > 0; 0= 1 for F < 0; and 0'(F) > 0 for F > 0.25 This
implies the following policy:
Proposition 2: Under the optimal enforcement policy, the penalty is the sum
of two components: one, a weighted average of the penalty that internalizes
consumer harm, (T+D)/z, and the investment subsidy -W/z, and two, the
enforcement cost c, where the probability of enforcement z is set at the
minimum level.
First, unlike the static scenario examined previously, the complete deterrence policy is no longer sensible. When the monopolist's investment makes
the product market available, its conduct always provides some benefit to
society, and it would therefore be suboptimal to set the penalty with the aim of
completely eliminating the firm's gain.
Second, because the subsidy weight 0 < 0< 1, the optimal penalty is a
two-part fine that (1), internalizes the cost of enforcement to the offender, and
(2), regulates the monopolization and investment decisions with a component
that is a convex combination of the static penalty and an investment subsidy.
Because the subsidy weight is greater than zero, the optimal penalty is unambiguously less than the staticpenalty that internalizes consumer harm.

Third, comparative statics for the optimal penalty differ from the static case.
Consider the behavior of the optimal penalty as consumer harm increases.
Unlike the static case, the optimal penalty does not go to infinity as the consumer
25 The properties of the optimal penalty are examined in the appendix, specifically in the proof of
Proposition 2. The optimal penalty (P = v/z - (S/z)6 + c) is equal to the net marginal social
harm from the offender's conduct, which is the difference between the harm to consumers and
the marginal innovation benefit. The innovation benefit is itself a function of the size of the
penalty.
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harm goes to infinity (see Proposition 2a in the appendix). The optimal penalty
increases with consumer harm to a limit consistent with sustaining investment.
Moreover, a decline in the probabilityof apprehensiondoes not necessarily cause the

optimalfine to increase (see Proposition 2b in the appendix). The reason is that,
as the probability of apprehension decreases, the optimal subsidy weight could
increase, because it may be socially preferable to encourage investment more.
It is not necessarily desirable to combine an extremely low probability of
apprehension with an extremely high fine.
The subsidy weight 0 captures the relative sensitivities of the firm's
innovation-investment and monopolization decisions with respect to the
penalty. When
h(zF*)

1 - H(zF*)

>

t(k)H(zF*)
0(7)

T(k)

the monopolization elasticity (with respect to the penalty) exceeds the investment elasticity, and the subsidy weight 0 < 1. The penalty is relatively large
because its shadow price, the discouragement of innovation, is relatively low.
When the inequality in (7) is reversed or replaced with a strict equality, the
subsidy weight is equal to one, yielding a pure subsidy in place of a penalty.
Note that the optimal penalty formula can be expressed as F = (1 - 0) [(T+
D) / z + c] + O(-Wz + c), which is a weighted average of the optimal static

penalty (internalizing consumer harm and enforcement cost) and the optimal
innovation subsidy (internalizing residual consumer surplus and administrative cost of award process). When the marginal social harm, v + zc, exceeds the
surplus S (or, equivalently, when the expected enforcement cost, zc, exceeds
the residual surplus W) the optimal penalty is unambiguously positive. This
makes sense because the loss from discouraging investment is relatively small
under these conditions, though the enforcement policy is still lenient relative
to the static model even in this worst-case scenario. When the surplus is
greater than the marginal harm (equivalently, residual surplus exceeds
expected enforcement cost), the optimal penalty can be positive (a penalty) or
negative (a subsidy), depending on whether the surplus gained from deterring
monopolization is greater than the wealth generated from investment (see
Proposition 2 the appendix). Punishment becomes more severe, holding other
factors the same, as the residual surplus falls and as the relative sensitivity of
innovation to the penalty falls.
The key policy implication is that it is not necessarily optimal to impose a
penalty for monopolization that internalizes consumer harm-such a penalty
may excessively deter innovation. Indeed, it may be optimal to subsidize rather
than punish the monopolizing firm. 2 6 One function of the fine is to align
26 It follows also that it may not be optimal to punish the firm even when there are no static
efficiencies resulting from the monopolizing conduct. The model assumes the existence of
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private and social incentives for innovation. If the firm monopolizes the market
in the second period with probability 1, the social gain from the firm's firstperiod investment would be the sum of the residual consumer surplus and the
monopoly transfer. The private gain, however, would be the monopoly transfer. Optimal punishment policy trades off deterrence of monopolization with
equalizing the private and social gains from investment, and the latter goal
requires a bounty based on the residual surplus.
Although we have focused on monopolizing conduct that might violate the
antitrust laws, the model applies equally to patents (or to any method of rent
appropriation). The penalty result here provides the optimal fee that should be
charged to a patentee, which could be a fine or a prize, depending on the
factors shown in (6).

3. GeneralApplications:Products Liability and Efficiency Defenses

The previous part examined the offender investment model in the antitrust
setting, under strict liability. In this part, we consider other applications, and
the rule of reason test for liability.
Consider product safety regulation. The firm invests in the first period, creating the market. In the second period, it decides whether to take care to avoid
imposing an injury v on the consumer. 27 It takes care only if the cost of taking
care M is less than the expected fine zF. The firm's investment in the first
period is a function of anticipated profit in the second, which is determined in
part by the relationship between M and zF. The optimal penalty, F = v/z (S / z)O + c, where 0 depends on the relative elasticities of precaution and innovation, compromises internalization in order to encourage innovation. This
is not a weighted average of consumer welfare components, as in the monopolization case examined earlier, because v does not have any necessary relationship to S. The optimal product safety penalty is unambiguously less than the
one that internalizes the consumer injury, and it could be a pure subsidy.
Suppose that, instead of strict liability, the punishment authority operates
under a rule of reason, which imposes punishment only when M < v.28 The
rule of reason test permits defendants to be exempted from punishment on the

static efficiencies. But the result that it may be optimal to reduce the penalty in order to
encourage innovation applies just as well to the case where there are no static efficiencies. Thus,
even if an exclusivity contract offers no cost advantage whatsoever, and serves the sole purpose
of excluding competitors, it still may not be optimal to punish the firm for monopolization.
27 This discrete choice assumption simplifies matters and is consistent with the products liability
case law. Every products liability design-defect case involves an allegation concerning a discrete
decision to adopt a precaution, such as installing a safety bar on a hazardous machine.
28 In antitrust, this test is equivalent to a rule of reason test that permits efficiency defenses (M > v
is equivalent to the case where the efficiency gain exceeds the deadweight loss, E > D). Under a
perfect-information rule of reason antitrust regime, there would be no need for antitrust
enforcement, because all inefficient cases of monopolization would be deterred.
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basis of efficiency defenses. This case has not been considered in the economic
treatments of punishment.29
Under the reasonableness rule, the social objective would be to set the fine
to maximize
NB = T(ko)J{(1 - H(v))E(M|M > v) + [(H(v)
- H(zF))E(Mlv > M > zF) - E(kojko < ko)]
+ (I - H(zF))(S - v - zc) + H(zF)S},

(8)

where ko = (1 - H(v))E(M | M > v) + (H(v) - H(zF)) [E(M | v > M > zF) - zF].

This objective function incorporates the facts that when M > v, the punishment authority will apprehend but not punish the offender; when v > M > zF,
the offender will be punished but will not be deterred from the offense; and
when zF > M, the offender will be deterred from committing the offense. The
optimality condition for (8) implies that the optimal fine is smaller (greater)
than the static penalty (viz + c) when the surplus is large (small) relative to the
marginal social harm. 30 The reason for enhancing the penalty (beyond the
static level) is to discourage some investment, given that some offenders will
not be punished under the reasonableness rule even though they have forced
society to bear the costs of apprehending them. The subsidy provided by the
optimal penalty is smaller because the reasonableness rule already exempts
some potential offenders from any punishment. The static penalty comes
closer to being socially optimal when the regulator punishes according to the
reasonableness standard than when he punishes under the strict liability rule.

4. Victim Investment

Potential victims invest in some activity, at cost kv. The gross gain from investment to the victim, if there is no offense, is B. However, because of the risk
that an offense will destroy the value of the investment, the victim's expected
gain is [1-prob(offense)]B. The victim suffers a direct loss v in the event an
offense occurs. We allow v to differ from B because it is possible that the
offense both destroys the value of the victim's investment and imposes a different direct loss on the victim.
Returning to the terms introduced in earlier, the expected private gain from
investment is H(zF)B. Suppose kv has probability distribution R, with corresponding density function r, r(kv) > 0 for kv > 0 and r(kv) = 0 otherwise. The
potential victim invests whenever kv < k, = H(zF)B, so the probability he
29 Becker, supra note 2; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16. In the static scenario, the most
interesting feature of the rule of reason is that it enables the enforcement authority to avoid any
enforcement expenditure at all. The offenders for whom M > v would not be deterred by the
threat of punishment (because they are exempted by the test), and those for whom M <v would
be deterred. There would never be a need for enforcers to act.
)
yy
y
H
q'(k*y~)
30
zF*= v+zc -()(H(v)-H(zF))(S-(1-H
&(hk;)(H(v)- H(zF

))2'+
+

)hzF

)
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invests is R(k,). The expected net benefit from investment is therefore
R(k,)E(k, - k,|k, < k,).

(9)

The investment benefit from increasing the fine is equal to the product of the
marginal reduction in the probability of an offense, zh(zF), and the expected
gain among the pool of potential investors RB. Increasing the fine, through its
deterrent effect, allows more of those who invest to realize their returns
without seeing them destroyed by the offender. The expected net benefit from
investment is maximized when the penalty is set at a level that eliminates the
offender's gain, F > M / z, and minimized when the penalty is set at zero.
Of course, a social planner would not set out solely to maximize the
expected net benefit from investment. The social objective is to maximize the
net benefits from enforcement, which is the sum of the net benefit from investment and the net benefit from offenses, given enforcement:
NB = NB(investment) + NB(offenses)
= R(k,) (k, - E(k Ik < k,))

(10)

+ (1 - H(zF)) [E(M|M > zF) - (v + zc)].

Proposition 3: Let NB* represent the value of the net benefit from enforcement
under the optimal policy, and let NB represent the value of the net benefit from
enforcement when offenses are completely deterred. Let M > v + z'c + R(k,)B
denote the value of M. such that NB* = NB . Then if Mu > M, the optimal punishment policy is to set the penalty and probability of apprehension so that
F* = - + c + Rk B. If M

5 M, then the optimal policy is to set the fine and the

probability of apprehension so that zF> M.
The optimal penalty internalizes the direct loss, the enforcement cost, and
the investment return forgone due to the fear of offenses. Here the circumstances under which a complete deterrence policy is optimal are broader than
in the static case. If the maximum gain to offenders is less than the marginal
social cost of an offense, complete deterrence is optimal, as in the static case.
However, even if the maximum gain exceeds the marginal social cost of an
offense, complete deterrence may be optimal, because the gain is insufficient
to compensate for the cost of reduced investment.
The case in which offensive conduct discourages investment by potential
victims was first considered by Jeremy Bentham, who referred to the "secondary effects" of criminal behavior. 3 1 Bentham noted that offensive conduct led
to primary and secondary harms to society; where primary harms are the direct
and derivative losses, as well as enforcement costs, and secondary harms are
the costs that result from discouraged investment and extend "either over the
31 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 153 (Prometheus
Books

1988) (1789).
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whole community, or over some multitude of unassignable individuals." 32
Secondary effects could include a range of costs generated by changes in behavior resulting from fear of crime. Bentham argued that punishment should
be enhanced to internalize secondary costs. The penalty formula derived here
formalizes Bentham's recommendation.

D. Headline Effects and Penalties
News headlines alter the investment decisions of offenders or victims. The
headlines may lead the offender to believe that the likelihood of apprehension
is greater than it is. To model headline effects, let the perceived probability of
apprehension differ from the real probability of apprehension: z~= z(1 +,u).
The optimal policy is now
1

1+

v

S(

Z'

z'

(k

(k*)h(z'(1+

(1 - H(z'(1+ p)F*))

)F*)+@(k0 )(1 -H(z'(1+,a)F*))2

}
(1 1)

which suggests that the fine should be reduced to compensate for the offender's overestimate of the likelihood of punishment (p > 0 case). However,
because the sign of the portion of the penalty regulating the investment decision is ambiguous, offender overestimation of the likelihood of apprehension
could raise or lower the optimal penalty. An overestimate of the probability of
punishment makes the punishment for monopolization seem more likely, but
the associated change in investment incentives could lead to a reduction in the
optimal subsidy component.
Now suppose the victim invests while relying on news headlines to predict the
likelihood that he will reap the rewards. The break-even cost level for the victim is
k, = (1 + q)H(zF)B, where r7> 0 means that the victim underestimates the likelihood of an offense that destroys his investment. The optimal penalty satisfies
F

v

- + c+
z

R(kV)B - q(1 + i)B 2 r(k*)H(zF)
z

,

(12)

implying that the penalty should be reduced when the victim underestimates the
likelihood of an offense, and increased when the victim overestimates the likelihood. The reason for reducing the penalty when the victim underestimates is to
align private and social incentives to invest. If the victim thinks that there will not
be an offense, he will invest too much in light of the return. The penalty is
reduced in order to indirectly diminish the investment incentive. 33
32 Id.

3 A similar problem is encountered in the context of crime and victim precaution. The optimal
fine varies in order to control the incentives of both offender and victim; see Keith N. Hylton,
OptimalLaw Enforcement and Victim Precaution,27 RAND J. ECoN. 197 (1996).
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The parameter 17is an index of the alarm-to-danger ratio identified by
Bentham. 34 If 17is equal to zero, the danger and alarm caused by offensive activity are the same; the impressions potential victims get from reading news
headlines are accurate indicators of the likelihood of an offense. If 17 is positive,
the alarm is less than the danger, and if r7is negative the alarm is greater than
the danger. The optimal penalty, consistent with Bentham, implies that the
fine should increase as the alarm increases relative to the danger, in order to
internalize the negative investment effect.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Antitrust
Because the normative implications of this model have been mentioned in the
course of its presentation, we will focus on positive implications for antitrust
law here. The offender investment model suggests that the social payoff
from innovation antecedent to or associated with monopolization should be
part of rule of reason analysis under the Sherman Act. The law appears to
reflect this recommendation already. Monopolies are not illegal per se. 3 5 Antitrust
law immunizes firms from liability when they have acted merely as profitmaximizing monopolists (for example, by setting the monopoly price).36
Liability is imposed under section 2 for predatory conduct and efforts to exclude
rivals. Exploitative conduct is distinguished from exclusionary conduct.
Although antitrust law is underinclusive in comparison with the optimal
penalty model presented here, the exemption provided to firms that merely
exploit their market power rather than exclude rivals can be understood as an
attempt by the law to accommodate the welfare gains from innovation. One
paradox of antitrust, stressed in Judge Hand's Alcoa opinion, is that cartel
pricing is per se illegal, whereas monopoly pricing is per se lawful. 37 These basic
rules are not contradictory under our model.
34 BENTHAM, supra note 31.
3 The legal standard is described as a balancing test that compares anticompetitive harms with
procompetitive benefits; see United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
36 In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand distinguished monopolies that are passively acquired, and
monopolies acquired through superior skill, foresight, and industry, from monopolies that are
actively acquired. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 429-31
(2d Cir. 1945); Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Extraction vs. Extension: The Basis for
FonnulatingAntitrust Policy Towards Single-Finn Conduct, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 285
(2008). Carlton and Heyer propose the distinction between extraction and extension as a
normative guideline for monopolization law. This model distinguishes innovation (creation)
from extraction. The distinctions are not the same. There are cases that could be described as
extension (tying, exclusive dealing) where punishment would have to be moderated in light of
investment incentive effects under this model.
3 The paradox served as a key justification for Judge Learned Hand's reform of monopolization
law in Alcoa. Hand argued that monopolies (monopoly pricing) should be viewed in the same
way as cartels (cartel pricing). Alcoa, 148 F.2d. at 427-29. For a discussion of innovation and its
implications for Hand's Alcoa argument, see Evans & Hylton, supra note 6.
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For firms that engage in exclusionary conduct, the law is overinclusive, in
the sense that it does not reduce expected penalties to compensate for the creation or expansion of markets through innovation. One exception is United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,3 8 where the court held that rule of reason
rather than per se liability applied to tying policies that were instituted at a time
when the market for antennae systems was in its infancy. Jerrold had played a
central role in the creation of the market. The court exempted Jerrold from
antitrust liability for the infancy period of its business, effectively a penalty reduction to compensate for innovation. Our model implies that the doctrine of
39
JerroldElectronicsshould be incorporated generally into monopolization law.
Of course, a symmetrical and opposing conclusion applies where the dominant firm's conduct discourages innovation by rivals. The rule of reason
should take into account evidence that the monopolist's conduct reduced
innovation by potential competitors.40

B. Torts
Now consider implications for tort law. The damage multiplier approach 4 1
suggests that the optimal tort damage award will divide the harm by the probability of liability. However, this is inadequate as a method of internalizing
social costs when there are negative investment effects from offenses.
Conversely, the multiplier approach inefficiently overdeters when the offender's investment yields a positive externality and is dependent on profits from
a later action that may cause harm.
Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam,
365 U.S. 567 (1961).
3 Jonathan Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST
3Q United States v.

L.J. 575 (2007). Baker argues that enforcement authorities are sensitive to innovation effects in
their targeting decisions. If enforcement authorities targeted only those cases in which the
monopolization effect is substantially greater than the investment effect (0 close to zero), then
antitrust enforcement would be virtually optimal, as Baker contends. This argument assumes a
best-case scenario for enforcement priorities, which seems implausible in view of the fact that
enforcement priorities vary according to the type of administration in office (anti-business
versus pro-business).
40 The offender-investment and victim-investment models can be combined to yield an optimal
penalty formula that balances opposing externalities. In the combined model, the penalty
would be reduced relative to the benchmark static penalty to the extent that punishment
reduced the social gain from investment by the offender, and enhanced to the extent that
punishment of the offender encouraged potential victims to invest. The net direction would be

ambiguous a priori,but could be simulated under parameter assumptions. Ilya Segal & Michael
D. Whinston, Antitrust in Innovative Industries, 97 AM. EcoN. REv. 1703 (2007). Segal and
Whinston suggest that a policy that protects victims would be preferable because it would
frontload profits to new innovators (entrants). These considerations complicate the analysis and
raise questions about the ability of an enforcement authority to implement a policy free from
error.
41 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV.

L. REv. 869 (1998).
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Suppose that the firm invests in a new vaccine in the first period. In the
second period, when the product is on the market, it can adopt some precaution
to reduce the likelihood of harm to consumers. The precaution could take many
different forms: enhancing the warning label, or better monitoring of the production process. The firm decides in the second period whether to take the precaution by comparing the cost of precaution to the expected fine. This description of
the vaccine marketing is analogous to the investment-monopolization model
examined earlier. It follows that the optimal penalty will depend on several
factors: the harm to the consumer, the positive externality to society (consumer
surplus from innovation and externalities from vaccination), and the degree
to which an increase in the penalty affects the investment incentive versus the
precaution incentive.
This implies that strict products liability may not be optimal in the innovation setting, or in a setting in which the firm's product yields beneficial externalities (for example, vaccines). If the injuries caused by the product are not
large in relation to the surplus created, the negligence standard may be preferable to strict liability.4 2

IV. CONCLUSION

Using a model of punishment with monetary penalties, we have examined the
design of optimal penalties in settings where agents make investments. The key
scenario examined is that in which the offender invests in an activity that benefits
society, and the private return to that activity is a function of the offense he later
commits, as well as the penalty. The optimal policy strikes a balance between
internalizing the costs of the offender's conduct and subsidizing the offender's
investment. In the monopolization setting, the optimal penalty is a weighted
average of a penalty that internalizes the consumer harm and a subsidy that
internalizes the consumer benefit created by investment, with the weights depending on the relative elasticities of investment and monopolization with
respect to the penalty. Under certain conditions, the subsidy component may
dominate the penalty, generating a reward for monopolization. Although
rewarding a monopolizing firm seems counterintuitive and inconsistent with
42 In the case of drugs, the law shows some signs of incorporating this implication, though the
record is mixed. Comment k of Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, suggests that
courts should exempt drug makers from strict liability for product defects (and defective
designs). See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049 (1988) (in which the California
Supreme Court held that comment k insulated all Food and Drug Administration-approved
prescription drugs from strict liability for design defect. The Court reasoned that strict liability
would deter innovation of new drugs. The California courts later applied the same reasoning to
implanted prescription medical devices.). See also Artiglio v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 4th
1388, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (1994); Plenger v. Alza Corp., 11 Cal. App. 4th 349, 13 Cal. Rptr.
2d 811 (1992). However, Brown has been adopted in only a minority of U.S. states. To some
extent, courts have moved in the direction of a negligence framework by embracing risk-utility
analysis.
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the static enforcement model, the law on monopolization-particularly its
puzzling leniency-is best explained by a theory that views encouraging innovation as one of the implicit goals of antitrust policy.

APPENDIX
Proofof Proposition 1: The social planner's problem is to choose z and F to minimize
C = H(zF)(E(M|M < zF)) + (1 - H(zF))(v + zc)

zF

= foMh(M)dM+(1 - H(zF))(v + zc).

The first-order conditions are:
0C
= -zh(zF) (v +zc - zF)
0C

7=

-Fh(zF)(v + zc - zF) + (1 - H(zF))c.

Note that when z* and F are chosen so that z*F is greater than M., then
the offender is completely deterred and the above equation equals E(AM). We
discuss the optimal choice of enforcement rate and penalty below.
v + z'c >M

(1)

This is the case where the minimum cost from an offense is higher than the
maximum benefit to the offender. In this case, it is optimal to eliminate
offenses by setting z*F greater than M.. Here is the proof.
C = H(zF)(E(M|M < zF)) + (1 - H(zF))(v + zc)
> H(zF)(E(M|M < zF)) + (1 - H(zF))Mu
> H(zF)(E(M|M < zF)) + (1 - H(zF))
x (E(M|M > zF)) = E(M)

In this scenario, E(M) is the lower bound for social cost, as in Figure Al.
Given a specific enforcement rate z, F e {F:F> M. /z}.
v + c < M"

(2)

Given a specific value of z, let F* - + c and FL
-u. Note here that
F <FL. When F<F; C is decreasingzand when F>F, C is increasing
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(F)

M<V+z C

F
Figure Al. Social cost as a function of the penalty

until it reaches E(M) for VF > FL. Figure A2 shows the relationship. Thus for
a given z, the optimal choice of F is F.
Moreover, given F, C is increasing in z so that it is optimal to set z* = z'.
V
Consequently, the optimal policy is { z* = z', F*
, + c } and the corresponding social cost is C* = H(v + z'c) (E(M | M < v + zc) + (1 - H(v + z'c)) (v + z'c).

Note that C* is smaller than E(M).
v + z'c < M

<v +c

(3)

Using the same logic, we know that given a specific value of z, the optimal F
v
is F* = - + c. Depending on the value of z, now F may be smaller or bigger
z
than FL. As for VF > FL, C remains at the level E(AMf) so it would be better to
have F < FL so that we could reach the cost level less than E(AMF). Thus in this
scenario, the optimal policy is again reached when z is set at its minimal level
and F equals to F, namely, {z* = z', F*

v
-- + c

Proofof Proposition 2: The proof follows in three steps.

First, we show that it is never optimal to set z*F greater than M. If z*F>
M, the offender will not make any investment and there will be no social gain.
Instead, for any z*F <MA,, we observe a positive social benefit as
NB = T(k 0 ){(1 - H(zF*))E(M|M > zF*)
- k + (1 - H(zF*)(S - v - zc) + H(zF*)S}
>

(k){(1 - H(zF*))(zF*+ S - v - zc) + H(zF*)S}

=1(ko)

T(k

- (k*)h(zF*)
0
S >0.
+ q(k*)(1 - H(zF*))2

0 )h(zF*)

Second, we need to prove that the optimal penalty z* is the unique solution to
the global maximum. The first order condition (equation 3 in the article) can
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Figure A2. Social cost as a function of the penalty

be simplified as follows:
8NB-F = (v + zc - zF){"J(ko)h(zF) +

2

(ko)(1 - H(zF))

1

(2A)
Pv
=- c-F--0}
zz Zz
where

P =1(ko)h(zF)+

S

(ko)(1 -H(zF))

2

and

0 = a (ko) (1 - H (zF))

P

Because P> 0, if there exists F such that
V

F =-+c
z

--

S
z

(2B)

(F),

then we will have
8NB
OF

0.
F,

To proceed, let us first take a look at 0, which is a function of F. When F<
0, 0= 1; when F> 0, 0 is strictly increasing in F because (1)

is increasing

h(zF)isdcesnin;(3(1-Hz)

in ko and ko is decreasing in F; (2) (1-H(zF)) is decreasing in F; (3) (1 - H(zF))
is decreasing in F; four, both "(k) ikand 1H(zF))arpoive
h(zF)are
positive.
Let

Omt,

be the value of 0 when F is approaching zero. It is straightforward

that Omin = limF o0 =

(

qi()

t(khd h(zF)om

< o1. [The avalue of

Omin will depend on
o

the shape of the distributional forms of V(-Q) and H(-). For example if we
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assume that both of them take an exponential form with mean of 1/2Y and
1

1/1kH, then Omin, =_(A/ /0)(e

/A" -1) +1

1
< --.
2

Let us then consider equation (2B). The left-hand side (LHS) of equation
(2B) is F itself, which could be treated as a strictly increasing function of F.
The right-hand side (RHS) then is a nonincreasing function where

RHS

z

+c-z ifF<0

-+c--0
z V

zS

if F > 0,

S
and the RHS reaches its maximum at -v + c - - Omin, when F -> 0. The follow-

ing three cases are explained for the equality of the LHS and RHS.
Case 1:2+c - > 0
It is obvious that in this case, 2 + c solution
F*

such

that

LHS= RHS

and

Omin > 0. There exists a unique
the

unique

equilibrium

is

S

V

- + c - - 0* > 0. The proof of the global maximum is quite straightforz
z

ward: when F < F, 9

> 0; and when F > F, '

< 0. This case

corresponds to the graph in Figure A3 below.
Before moving to Case 2, we will briefly discuss two properties of the Case 1
solution.
Proposition 2a: As v goes to infinity, the optimal penalty converges to a
constant F that satisfies O(F ) 1.
450 (LIIS )

'

z

+c

S

(RH4S' F<O)

z

Figure A3. Case 1
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Figure A4. Case 2

Proof Recall that the optimal penalty F satisfies:
v
S
RHS= -+c--(F*)
z
z

=c --

w
z

+

(v+w)
z

(1

(F*))

F* = LHS
First, it is easy to show that F is increasing in v. To see why, assume that v is
increased to v' and the associated optimal penalty is F'.We need to show that
F' > F. Assume otherwise that F' < F, 0(F') <0(F), so that RHS(F') >
RHS(F'). However LHS(F')

5 LHS(F)

so that RHS(F') > LHS(F'), a

contradiction. Second, we need to show that when v goes to infinity, F does
not goes to infinity. Otherwise if F goes to infinity, 0 will also go to infinity. As
a result, RHS(F) goes to negative infinity, which contradicts the fact that LHS
(F) goes to positive infinity. Last, because F is increasing in v and because F
is finite as v goes to infinity, then it must be the case that 0 goes to 1 so that the
optimal penalty makes RHS = LHS. We have shown that 0 is increasing in F,
so that the optimal penalty is F* which satisfies 0(F*) = 1.
Proposition 2b: When z is decreasing, F is ambiguous.
Proof It is easy to show that when z is decreasing, zF is decreasing as well. To
see why, because v/zo + c - (S/zo)0(zoFo) = F0 , we have v + z 0 c - S6(zoFo)
zoFo. Now zo is decreased to z1 and v + zic - S0(zFi1) = ziF1 . If zjF > zoFo

we know that S0(z 1 F1 ) > S6(zoFo) (as 0 is increasing in zF) and so that
v + z 1 c - S0(z 1 Fl) < v + z 0 c - S0(zoFo). However, if z 1 Fj > z 0 F 0 , v + z 1 c S0(zF 1 ) > v + z 0 c - S6(zoFo) by the definition of the optimum. We see a

contradiction here so that z1 F1 < zoFo. The remaining question is whether F
is increasing or decreasing. Using the implicit function theorem, dF/dz =
and this depends on the
'9
+ s')F]/z(1+ sO'), where
[c -(1
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which further depends on the function 0, es-

comparison of c and (1 + s')F,
pecially the value of 0' at F.
Case 2:

+ c-

< 0 and + c -

Omin < 0

Again we obtain a unique optimum F* = + cz is the global maximum as when F < F,
NBI

Case 3:
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z

< 0 for LHS= RHS. F

00;adwhn>
and when F > F,
< 0. This case corresponds to the graph in Figure A2.
S
+ c - - < 0 and +c -

NB FFF
OF

Omin > 0

There exist two F (one for F < 0 and the other for F > 0) such that
LHS= RHS: F = +c -

< 0 and F2* = +c -

0* > 0. It can be verified

that both are local maximums because F
> 0 and
>NB> < 0; and
OFNB
> 0 and NB
<0. The solutions are illustrated in Figure A5.
FFF

NBIO<F<F
2 >

The global maximum is the F' that provides the higher social benefit.
Consider the following comparison of the two F solutions:
F*2
1 z +c -<0
so that
=M+S- v -zc
k=M -zF
NBI = f(k ){A - E(klk < k) +(S

=

v

zc)}

J

1ko

1(kl)ko

kq(k)dk

0

45?(LHS)
vS
+

4-c+__

Figure A5. Case 3

(RffHSF>0)
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S

V

z

-2

- 0* > 0 so that ko
z

+ c -

NB 2 =

(k-){(1

1

ZFMh(M)dM - (1 - H(zF))zF2 <ko

H(zF2 ))E(M|M > zF)M - E(kjk < k2)

+ (1 - H(zF))(S -

v - zc) +

H(zF)S

k) {k+ (1- H(zF))zF - E(kjk<ko)
v - zc) + H(zF)S

+ (1 - H(zF9))(S =

k )ko

k (k)dk + S - S(1 - H(zF))*

Note that 0* must be less than one because F* = 2 + c
F2 = + c -

0* > 0. Also note that T (ko)ko
2

< 0 and

- fo k (k)dk is strictly increasing

1

1)k
2
inko and ko < k1, we have '(kl)k
- fokkq(k)dk>
)k --k
kq(k)dk.
Still, NB2 could be greater than NB, given a large enough S. The net subsidy solution F1 is preferable to the penalty F 2 if the enhanced wealth from additional
investment is greater than the wealth gained from deterring monopolization with
the penalty.
Last, we show that it is optimal to set z = z'. The first-order condition with
respect to z is as follows:

8NB-&N=
F(v + zc - S - zF){(ko)h(zF) +
OZ

x (1 - H(zF))2
- FS{

(ko)

_ko)(1 - H(zF))cF

(ko)H(zF)(1 - H(zF)) - T(ko)h(zF)}.

Given that F= F,=-(o

H(zF*))c < 0 so that it is optimal to

choose the minimum enforcement rate.
Proofof Proposition3: The social welfare function can be expressed as
NB = R(k,)(k, - E(kjk < k,)) + (1 - H(zF)){E(M|M > zF) - (v + zc)},
where k, = H(zF)B.
Assume that zF < Mu. The two first-order conditions for the welfare maxi-

mization problem are:
8NBON= R(k,)Bzh(zF) + zh(zF)(zc + v - zF),

where the first term denotes marginal gain from investment; and
NB = Fh(zF)(zc + v - zF + R(k,)B)
- (1 - H(zF))c.
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Using the same logic of the basic model (see Proposition 1), it is easy to
show that for a given value of z, F is optimally set so that F* - + c +
.
And because NB is decreasing in z when F* = 2 + c +

, it is optimal to

choose enforcement rate at its minimal level, namely z* = z'.
Now let NB* denote the social welfare evaluated at (z', F), namely,
NB* = R(k*) (k - E(k k < k*)) + (1 - H(z'F*)) {E(M|M
> z'F*) - (v + z'c)}.

And let NB be the social welfare evaluated when F e {F:F>Mu/z}. In this
latter scenario, the offense is completely deterred and social welfare depends solely
on the victim's net gain from investment, where NB = R(B) [B - E(k |k, < B)].
Ms < v + z'c + R(k*)B

(3)

In this case, it is optimal to set z* F greater than M. as NB* is smaller than
NB.

NB* - NB < R(k*)(k* - E(kIk < k*)) + (1 - H(z'F*))
x (M

(v + z'c)) - R(B) [B - E(k,|k, < B)]

< R(k*)(k* - E(k k < k*)) + (1 - H(z'F*))R(k*)B
- R(B) [B - E(k,|k, < B)]
*B

*B

=' kr(k)dk - BJ r(k)dk
B

<B

B

r(k)dk - B
M

First, let A

r(k)dk = 0

> v+z'c + R(k*)B

(4)

NB* - NB and it is easy to show that A is increasing in M. as
OMA =Mah(Mu).

Let M denote the value of M. such that NB* - NB = 0. Based on case (3), it
is obvious that M is bigger than v + z'c + R(k*)B. For Mu E {M, : Ms > M},

NB* > NB

so

that

{z',F}

is

the

optimal

NB* < NB, NB* < NB so that z*F > M. is the optimal policy.

policy;

for
m

